In a decision widely regarded as a milestone in democratic consolidation in post-Jammeh Gambia, High Court Justice Ebrima Jaiteh acquitted and discharged Abdoulie Sanyang on charges of arson and interference with judicial proceedings on February 10, 2026. The ruling sends a clear message: freedom of expression under Section 25 of the 1997 Constitution protects even sharp, provocative commentary on public institutions—including the judiciary—unless the state proves deliberate intent to obstruct justice and a realistic risk of prejudice.
The case originated from Sanyang’s live appearance on West Coast Radio’s “Coffee Time with Peter Gomez” on August 14, 2025. During the broadcast, he commented on an ongoing high-profile trial (The State v. Ousainou Bojang and Amie Bojang) and referenced the 2016 burning of the APRC Bureau in Kanifing. Prosecutors charged him under the relatively new Criminal Offences Act, 2025, alleging that describing courts as “clandestine” and implying external control constituted intentional disrespect and interference capable of prejudicing proceedings (Count 2). A separate arson count (Count 1) accused him of financing the 2016 arson, partly based on interpretations of statements made in the same interview.
After a complete trial featuring seven prosecution witnesses, multiple exhibits—including the full video and audio of the interview—and testimony from Sanyang himself, Justice Jaiteh delivered a meticulously reasoned judgment acquitting on both counts.
On the interference charge, the court set a high bar aligned with constitutional protections and common-law tradition. Justice Jaiteh invoked the Privy Council’s famous 1936 decision in Ambard v Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, reaffirming that “justice is not a cloistered virtue” and must endure public scrutiny. He stressed four essential elements the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
- Pending judicial proceedings existed (satisfied here);
- The accused made a speech or writing concerning those proceedings (also satisfied);
- The speech misrepresented proceedings, was capable of prejudicing a party, or amounted to intentional disrespect; and
- The conduct was carried out with specific intent to interfere with, obstruct, prejudice, or undermine the administration of justice.
The judge found the third and fourth elements decisively unproven. No evidence demonstrated actual or probable prejudice to the ongoing case: no judicial officer testified to feeling pressured, no witness conduct changed, and no procedural impact occurred. In Gambia’s non-jury system, where professional judges decide cases solely on admissible evidence and law, the risk of improper influence from public statements is inherently lower.
Crucially, Justice Jaiteh held that strong, even “ill-advised” or “provocative” language does not automatically cross into criminal territory. The prosecution failed to show material misrepresentation or the requisite mens rea (guilty intent to pervert justice). Convicting on the basis of discomfort or perceived undermining of public confidence alone, the judge warned, would risk “chilling legitimate public commentary and debate” and erode constitutionally guaranteed free expression.
The arson acquittal rested on separate but reinforcing grounds: lack of independent corroboration. While the court accepted that the APRC Bureau was deliberately set ablaze (per credible eyewitness evidence), it found no cogent proof linking Sanyang—then outside the country—to aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the act. The prosecution’s case hinged heavily on alleged admissions in police statements (retracted by Sanyang) and the radio interview. Justice Jaiteh ruled that retracted extra-judicial statements, standing alone without financial records, communications, or other witnesses, cannot safely support a conviction for such a grave offence.
Immediately after the acquittal, the state announced its intention to appeal under section 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 2025, and sought remand pending appeal, citing Sanyang’s Swiss nationality and non-residency. Justice Jaiteh declined, granting bail on modest conditions (D50,000 bond plus one Gambian surety), emphasizing the continuing presumption of innocence and the principle that an acquitted person’s liberty should be curtailed only in exceptional circumstances.
The ruling carries far-reaching implications for The Gambia’s young democracy. It reaffirms that the judiciary will not lightly criminalize criticism of itself or other state institutions, even when expressed in emotive or politically charged terms. By demanding concrete proof of intent and prejudice rather than vague notions of “disrespect,” the decision guards against misuse of section 99 of the 2025 Act as a tool to silence dissent, activists, journalists, or ordinary citizens engaging in public discourse on governance, elections, accountability, and transitional justice.
For media houses, civil society, and citizens, the judgment offers vital legal reassurance: robust debate on matters of national importance remains protected. It strengthens the post-2017 democratic dispensation by demonstrating judicial independence, fidelity to evidence, and fidelity to constitutional rights, even in the face of political pressure or institutional sensitivity.
In an era when many young democracies face tensions between accountability for past abuses and safeguarding open debate, Justice Jaiteh’s carefully reasoned acquittal stands as a powerful endorsement of free speech as an indispensable pillar of the rule of law.
