By Hon. Sarjo Barrow
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice or the United States.
As constitutional reform returns to the national agenda, The Gambia stands at a decisive crossroads. The choices we make now will shape our democracy for generations. At the heart of this debate lies a simple but profound question: should our Constitution protect the people from power, or should it be easily reshaped by those who hold power?
History offers a clear answer. When constitutions are easy to amend, democracy becomes fragile. Power shifts away from citizens and into the hands of politicians who may prioritise self-preservation over the public good. Across Africa, weak and easily altered constitutions have enabled democratic backsliding, political instability, and, in some cases, violent upheaval. The Gambia must not repeat these mistakes.
A statutory constitution, one that Parliament can amend without the direct consent of the people, leaves our democracy dangerously exposed. Such a framework allows political elites to rewrite the rules of governance to suit their interests. A genuinely democratic constitution, by contrast, must be anchored in popular sovereignty and protected by mandatory referenda. Only the people should have the final say on changes to the nation’s highest law.
The dangers of statutory constitutions are not theoretical. West Africa offers sobering examples. In countries such as Guinea and Burkina Faso, leaders exploited flexible constitutional arrangements to extend their rule or weaken institutional checks, triggering unrest and, ultimately, military coups. These crises occurred not because constitutions were ignored, but because they were too easily manipulated. The lesson is clear: when constitutional change is left solely to politicians, democracy suffers.
The Gambia’s own experience under the 1997 Constitution is a painful reminder. Drafted under a military regime, that constitution omitted presidential term limits and proved remarkably easy to amend. President Yahya Jammeh governed “constitutionally” for 22 years while remaining in power, amending the constitution more than 50 times to consolidate authority. This was not an accident; it was a design flaw that concentrated power away from the people. A constitution that enables such outcomes is not a safeguard—it is a liability.
Some argue that strong institutions can compensate for a flexible constitution. Senegal is often cited as an example. Yet even there, ambiguity over term limits under President Macky Sall sparked mass protests and political tension. Democracy survived not because the constitution was clear, but because citizens actively defended it and institutions intervened at critical moments. That resilience should be admired, but it also highlights how precarious democracy becomes when foundational rules are open to political interpretation.
The most effective safeguard against constitutional abuse is to place the people at the centre of every amendment process. No president, no parliament, and no political party should have the power to alter the basic rules of our democracy without the direct approval of citizens through a binding referendum. Core principles, presidential term limits, separation of powers, judicial independence, and fundamental rights must never be treated as negotiable political instruments.
This does not mean adopting an inflexible or overly detailed constitution. On the contrary, The Gambia needs a concise and principled constitution that clearly sets out the foundations of democratic governance, while leaving policy matters to ordinary legislation. This approach, supported by many reform advocates during the 2020 constitutional process, recognises that constitutions should establish enduring values rather than attempt to regulate every aspect of public life. Experience has shown that overly detailed constitutions often invite frequent amendments, reinforcing a statutory mindset and weakening citizen participation.
Entrenchment of all provisions is therefore essential, but entrenchment alone is not enough. Amendments affecting core constitutional principles should require supermajorities in Parliament, approval through referenda, and safeguards against last-minute changes close to elections. These mechanisms would preserve democratic flexibility while preventing partisan manipulation.
If concerns remain about rigidity, they can be addressed through robust judicial review and responsive lawmaking. But on the fundamental rules of our democracy, there should be no compromise. Sovereignty belongs to the people, and only the people should have the authority to change the social contract that binds us.
The lessons of the 1997 Constitution and the failed 2020 draft are unmistakable: when politicians control constitutional change, citizens lose. A durable democracy requires a constitution that rises above personal ambition and party politics. This moment calls for courage and clarity. The Gambia must insist on a constitution rooted in popular will and protected by popular consent. Only then can we secure a democratic future worthy of our children and future generations. Our democracy’s strength depends on a constitution that protects it, and that protection must come from the people.
