Madi Jobarteh, a prominent human rights defender and founder and executive director of the Banjul-based Edward Francis Small Center for Rights and Justice, has issued a stark warning to West African leaders: reform the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or watch it crumble into irrelevance.
In a hard-hitting opinion piece titled “From Tinubu to Bio: Reform ECOWAS or Watch It Collapse,” Jobarteh paints a grim picture of a region plagued by poverty, inequality, coups, and conflict nearly seven decades after Ghana’s independence in 1957. He argues that ECOWAS, established in 1975 to foster unity and prosperity, has devolved into a mere conflict-resolution body, failing to build democratic institutions or empower citizens.
Jobarteh criticizes the bloc’s inconsistent record, marked by elite protectionism and eroding credibility. He highlights the tenure of former ECOWAS Chairman Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who assumed the role in 2023 amid unprecedented crises. Three member states—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—exited to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), joining Guinea under military rule. Tinubu’s initial threats of force to restore constitutional order fizzled into inaction, allowing the departures without meaningful response or internal reform.
Sierra Leone’s President Julius Maada Bio, who succeeded Tinubu in June 2025, has vowed to restore order, deepen democracy, promote economic integration, and rebuild trust. Jorbateh acknowledges Bio’s energetic regional tours as a positive step but insists good intentions fall short without structural change.
“The problem is not a lack of resources; it is a lack of power where it belongs,” Jorbateh writes. For decades, ECOWAS has centralized authority in the hands of presidents, sidelining citizens and institutions. Summits yield communiqués and photo-ops, while constitutions are violated, courts ignored, elections rigged, and freedoms suppressed.
Jobarteh attributes ECOWAS’s failures to its flawed structure, not individual leaders. The Authority of Heads of State dominates, rendering the Commission a secretariat, the Parliament ceremonial, and the Community Court of Justice ineffective. Existing instruments—such as the 1993 Revised Treaty, the 1999 Conflict Prevention Mechanism, and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance—are routinely flouted by those they are meant to constrain, fostering impunity.
To create a “People’s ECOWAS,” Jobarteh proposes a treaty-level overhaul with four pillars, among them a Directly Elected Parliament: transform the current nominated body into one elected by citizens, with legislative, oversight, and budgetary powers. No major decisions—treaties, sanctions, or appointments—should proceed without parliamentary approval.
He also suggests a limited Presidential Power, which will Subject Heads of State to parliamentary oversight and judicial review; bar leaders who violate the constitution or suppress opponents from participating in related votes.
Jobarteh urges Bio to launch a 12-month Reform Agenda, including draft treaty amendments, a People’s ECOWAS Convention involving civil society, youth, and unions; pilot parliamentary elections; and automatic sanctions for court defiance or corruption.
Without reform, Jobarteh warns, more states may embrace isolationism and authoritarianism, eroding faith in ECOWAS as a leaders’ mutual protection pact. A reformed bloc could attract investment and restore trust. The Sahel split, he says, is both a warning and an opportunity—reintegration must prioritize constitutional governance via independent institutions.
“West Africa does not need another summit. It needs a new social contract,” Jobarteh argues.
