By Hon. Sarjo Barrow, Esq.
The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Department of Justice or the United States.
The Procedural Context
Reviewing Kexx News, it was reported that the defense made a few preliminary objections to the amended information (bill of indictment). While such is expected, nothing less should be expected from a competent and zealous advocate; all but one ruling left me perturbed from a constitutional standpoint. Importantly, it strikes at the authority of a prosecutor to decide when and how to charge—prosecutorial discretion. Something the court can’t and should not encroach.
Procedurally, the state amended the bill of indictment against former Jungler Sanna Manjang, charging him, among other counts, with conspiracy to commit an unlawful act under the then-criminal code (the law in effect at the time the act occurred). Specifically, it was alleged that he conspired with others, being described as “Black Black” or “Junglers” in the indictment. In both counts, the prosecution has deliberately chosen not to name the other participants. It is respectfully submitted that this is not a drafting oversight. It is a legally defensible and constitutionally sound choice. A court should be slow to order the State to refile the indictment with those names inserted, and the reasons for that caution are both principled and well-grounded in law.
The Validity of “Others” as a Charging Formula
It is well settled that a conspiracy charge need not identify every alleged participant by name in the charging document to be valid. In United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975), the court drew a careful and instructive distinction between the various ways in which a co-conspirator’s identity may come to light. Where a name surfaces through a bill of particulars, it emerges as the statement of the prosecutor alone and does not carry the formal authority of grand jury action. Its public impact may be moderated through protective orders. Where a name surfaces through trial testimony, it is spoken by a private individual making no formal adjudication of criminality. An indictment, however, is the formal act of an impartial, formally convened quasi-judicial body of historical status and power, and it carries a weight on the reputation of its subject that no other instrument in the criminal process matches. To name a person as an unindicted conspirator in a public indictment is therefore qualitatively different from, and graver than, identification through any alternative disclosure mechanism.
That reasoning was reinforced in United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-257 (D.D.C. 2023), where six alleged co-conspirators were described by number only as “Co-Conspirator 1” through “Co-Conspirator 6.” The indictment was upheld as valid. The absence of names did not defeat the charges, impair the particularity of the allegations, or prejudice the accused’s ability to understand what he faced. Together, Briggs and Trump establish the same clear proposition: naming co-conspirators in a public charging instrument is not a legal requirement, and compelling it risks producing outcomes that no court should wish to endorse.
The Position Under Gambian Law
The Gambia Criminal Procedure Act 2025 is entirely consistent with this position. Section 2 of the Act defines a “complaint” as an allegation that a person “known or unknown” has committed an offence. That language is not incidental. It reflects a deliberate legislative recognition that criminal proceedings may validly proceed even where not all participants are identified by name. The conspiracy counts in the Manjang indictment, alleging that the accused acted “with others or ‘Jungulars,’” sit comfortably and properly within this framework.
Section 139 of the Act requires that all necessary particulars of the offence be specified in the charge. The particulars already present in the Manjang conspiracy count are substantive and detailed. They state the date, location, victim, nature of the intended harm, and the accused’s membership in the Junglers. These particulars satisfy the requirements of Section 139. The identities of unnamed participants are not, as a matter of law, a required particular of the conspiracy offence. What the law requires is that the accused understand the agreement alleged against him, with whom, in general terms, and to what criminal end. All of that is present on the face of the existing indictment.
Section 340 of the Act further provides that proceedings are not reversible merely by reason of an error or omission in a charge, provided the omission has not occasioned a failure of justice. With respect, to order a refiling to insert names that the law does not require would be to elevate procedural formalism above the interests of justice in a manner that the Act itself expressly discourages.
The Constitutional Concern with Compelling Disclosure
This is perhaps the most important consideration of all, and it speaks directly to the court’s duty to protect the rights of all persons, including those not before it.
The individuals described in the conspiracy counts as “others” or “Jungulars” have not been charged. They carry, under Article 24(3) of the 1997 Constitution of the Gambia, the full and unqualified presumption of innocence. That presumption is not merely a passive procedural right. It is an active constitutional protection that prevents the state from publicly branding a person as a criminal participant in serious offences without affording that person the procedural safeguards of formal accusation, notice, and trial.
To insert their names into a public indictment, a document that forms part of the open court record, attracts press coverage, and carries the full authority of a state prosecution, would be to effectively adjudicate their involvement in the conspiracy without any of those safeguards. As the court in Briggs recognized, this is a stain that cannot easily be removed. Even if those individuals are never subsequently charged, the reputational harm of appearing in a filed indictment as named participants in the operations of a state-sanctioned torture and killing unit is immediate, serious, and in practical terms irreversible. While the author holds no remorse for anyone associated with an outfit (Black Black or Jungulars), where the TRRC demonstrated the cruel and cold-blooded behavior of killing innocent civilians, it’s the constitution, we all hold fidelity to, after our Holy Books.
This concern carries particular weight in the Gambian context. The Manjang prosecution is among the most closely watched accountability proceedings to emerge from the TRRC process. Public and media attention are significant. In that environment, to have one’s name appear on a court indictment as a named, unindicted conspirator in the acts described in this case would have consequences of the gravest kind for any private individual not yet before the court, consequences that no subsequent proceedings could adequately undo.
The Better Path: Alternative Mechanisms
It is important to acknowledge that the defence has a legitimate and entirely proper interest in knowing who the “others” are, to prepare adequately for trial. That interest is real, and the court is right to be attentive to it. The point, however, is that this legitimate interest can be fully satisfied through mechanisms that do not require the public naming of uncharged individuals in the indictment itself.
First, the summary of evidence required under Section 225 of the CPA 2025, filed alongside the indictment, will ordinarily disclose the witnesses the prosecution intends to call. Where any of those witnesses participated in the events alleged and are expected to testify, their identities will emerge through that process, in a context that serves the defence’s preparatory needs without publicly declaring non-defendants to be conspirators on the face of a charging document.
Second, if the defence takes the view that it genuinely cannot prepare an adequate case without more specific disclosure of who the “others” are, it may apply to the court for further and better particulars to be provided privately. This remedy, available through the court’s inherent jurisdiction informed by Section 231 and the charge-framing rules under Section 142, serves precisely the purpose the defence requires. It is the functional equivalent of the United States Bill of Particulars: it delivers the necessary information to the defence without making that disclosure a matter of public record in the indictment.
Third, the prosecution’s disclosure obligations under Section 241, governing additional witnesses, and the broader constitutional duty of fairness embedded in the 1997 Constitution, will independently require the State to identify any co-participants whose evidence forms part of the prosecution case, again through controlled disclosure rather than public naming in the charge.
Conclusion
With respect, an order compelling the State to refile or amend the Manjang indictment to name the alleged co-conspirators expressly would be legally unnecessary, procedurally disruptive to a prosecution of considerable public importance, and constitutionally problematic in its effect on individuals who are not before the court and have not been charged.
The law does not require names on the face of a conspiracy charge. The persuasive authority of Briggs and Trump confirms it. The Gambia Criminal Procedure Act 2025 accommodates it. The Constitution of the Gambia demands respect for the rights of the unnamed. The defence’s legitimate needs are already capable of being met through the disclosure mechanisms provided by the Act. The most constitutionally faithful course, and the one most consistent with the interests of justice, is to allow the indictment to stand as filed, and to direct that any further particulars be furnished through the appropriate procedural channels, privately, and in a manner that protects both the rights of the accused and the rights of those not yet before the court.
