By: Pa Sawaneh
The Gambia government’s concession agreement with Turkey’s Albayrak Group over the Port of Banjul has been presented as a move to enhance operational efficiency. Transport Minister Ebrima Sillah has defended the deal as a landmark achievement “in favour of the Gambia government.” In a recent interview on Coffee Time with Peter Gomez, he stressed that the state retains ownership of all port assets, takes no operational risk, and earns a guaranteed share of revenue.However, when the numbers are unpacked, it becomes clear that the arrangement, while operationally efficient, heavily favours the foreign operator — not the Gambian state.
What the Minister Says
Under the deal:- The government earns 4% of the port’s gross revenue, paid before any deductions.- Albayrak covers all staff costs (27% of gross) and other operational expenses (22–25% of gross).- The remaining profit is split 80–20 — but in Albayrak’s favour.- Albayrak paid about €5.2M for the use of movable assets, which will be returned at the end of the concession.- 10% of the operator’s profit must be reserved for future deep-sea port investment.The minister argues that the 4% gross share, combined with a portion of net profit and zero risk to government, makes this one of the best concession deals in Africa.
The Numbers Tell a Different Story
While 4% of gross revenue might sound fair in isolation, it represents a very small slice of the pie — just $40,000 on every $1 million earned, regardless of how profitable the port is. The remaining 96% of gross revenue stays with Albayrak to cover expenses and generate profit.After expenses (27% staff costs + 24% other = 51% total), what remains becomes the profit pool — split 80–20 in Albayrak’s favour. Even in healthy revenue scenarios, this ensures the operator consistently earns two to three times more than the government.Example: On $1 million gross revenue:- Government: $40,000 (4% gross) + $92,000 (20% of profit) = $132,000- Albayrak: $368,000 — nearly three times more.If the government had retained control and operated the port efficiently, it could have kept 100% of profits after costs — $500,000 in the same example — instead of $132,000. Over decades, this represents hundreds of millions in lost revenue.
Why This Matters
This is not to ignore the importance of efficiency and modernization. The Port of Banjul has faced chronic bottlenecks, and bringing in private-sector expertise can improve operations. However, efficiency gains mean little if they come at the expense of sovereign revenue control.Ports are strategic national assets. Around the world, many governments partner with private operators without giving away the lion’s share of profits. A more balanced deal — such as a higher fixed percentage of gross revenue or a 50–50 profit split — could have improved operations while safeguarding national income.
How the Deal Compares Globally
Port / Model
Government Revenue Share
Operator Share / Notes
Gambia — Banjul (current)
4% of gross + 20% of profit
96% gross retained → 80% of profit
Somalia — Mogadishu
55% of revenue
45% to operator
Burundi — Bujumbura
Majority state ownership (~64%)
Operator minority share
Pakistan — Gwadar
9% of port revenue
91% to operator
Follow the Money
Using the minister’s own figures, the government’s $132,000 per $1M gross is far outpaced by Albayrak’s $368,000 — all while the foreign operator controls expenses and operations.
The current concession may modernize the Port of Banjul, but it cements a revenue structure where the foreign operator is the biggest winner and the state settles for a fraction of what it could have earned.In financial terms, this is operational efficiency at the cost of sovereign revenue — and for a country where every dalasi counts, that is a costly trade-off.
