By Lamin Jahateh
There is no space for a ministry of truth in countering disinformation – European Digital Media Observatory
In the first part of this two‑part commentary, I highlighted the real and growing threats that mis‑ and disinformation pose to The Gambia, particularly amid rising political and social tensions and the growing influence of artificial intelligence. I outlined the current state of the national fact‑checking ecosystem, which played a crucial role in the 2021 elections through real-time independent fact-checking and continues to hold both government and opposition actors accountable. The commentary also highlighted the misalignment between the government’s recently launched National Misinformation and Disinformation Response Centre (NMDRC) and global best practice, which favours independent, civil society‑led fact‑checking. Concerns were raised because governments are frequently among the largest sources of misleading claims, and state‑run national fact‑checking carries inherent risks of politicisation. The NMDRC’s failure to prioritise the more urgent threat of hate and dangerous speeches was also identified as a significant limitation.
A necessary clarification
Nothing in the first part questioned the technical competence of the NMDRC’s implementing partner or the personal credibility of those leading that company. The critique focused squarely on the government’s involvement in the centre, based on established standards and the political realities of The Gambia. Moreover, under access to information principles, any private company executing a publicly funded service should be held to the same standards of transparency and accountability as a public agency to the extent of that service delivery.
In addition, the claim that the centre is neutral and independent of government appears inconsistent with its official status. On its own website, the government describes the centre as an “official government initiative designed to protect citizens from false information”. Beyond this explicit labelling, the platform is hosted on the government domain – one that does not even host some independent statutory bodies. Also, based on the information available on its website, the centre operates under the Ministry of Information. In its statement, the government describes the involvement of a “technical lead” (a private company), not a co-owner or co-governor of the platform. The involvement of a private company in delivering a government project, particularly in a technical capacity, does not transform the initiative into a private one. It is therefore somewhat off-putting that so much effort is currently being invested in presenting the centre as an neutral and independent body, when its structure and presentation clearly indicate otherwise.
Moving from critique to constructive solutions
This second part presents possible safeguards and solutions for the centre, drawing on lessons and best practices from across Africa and around the world.
Option one: Acknowledging the Centre as a Government Communications Unit
If the NMDRC is indeed a government entity, then the officials should openly acknowledge this and reposition the centre accordingly, rather than promoting it as an independent, neutral platform for truth. This does not in any way undermine its partnership with the private entity responsible for technical implementation. Instead of branding the centre as an independent fact‑checker, it should be reframed as a part of the government’s communications machinery with a mandate limited to correcting mis- and disinformation about government policies, services, institutions, etc.
In Africa, this model is already seen in many countries, including South Africa, where government departments monitor disinformation about themselves and react accordingly. In the U.S and several European countries, different arms of government actively debunk and clarify disinformation without claiming to be neutral arbiters of truth in public discourse. The NMDRC would be far more credible and effective if its mandate focused on timely clarification of government‑related claims.
Option two: Genuine Independence
If, however, the centre is indeed meant to be the independent and neutral national platform for truth, there is a need for institutional and structural adjustments:
Step 1: One of the most obvious practical steps is to take the platform off the government domain and establish a standalone, independently managed fact-checking website. Hosting the centre on a government domain inherently contradicts claims of independence. It introduces structural risks. A platform embedded within government‑controlled digital infrastructure cannot credibly claim operational autonomy.
Moreover, hosting the national fact-checking platform on a government domain exposes it to the risk of algorithmic manipulation, no matter how transparent the public operations seem to be. While AI‑backed systems can be designed with safeguards, they are not immune to manipulation, such as content ranking and visibility. A government-controlled server or content delivery network could, in theory, suppress fact-checks that are unfavorable to the government, redirect traffic, or inject tracking code. While there is no evidence this is happening yet, the structural possibility undermines trust.
In addition, if the government domain is shut down, whether due to political decisions or otherwise, the centre’s website would go offline instantly. For an independent, neutral entity, such a vulnerability is too much to consume. International best practice shows that credibility in fact‑checking, just like journalism as a whole, depends heavily on perceived and real structural independence. If the government is serious about independence, the solution is straightforward: move the centre to an independent domain.
Step 2: Following this, the next critical step is to establish a multi‑stakeholder governing board. The government has spoken of establishing an independent governing structure to ensure full operational autonomy. Yet, despite the platform’s launch and ongoing operations, there is no publicly available information about the constitution of this body. This is a basic but critical safeguard to insulate the centre from political interference.
However, even with such a board, independence cannot be guaranteed if the platform remains institutionally housed within government. One only needs to look at the operations of the Gambia Radio and Television Services (GRTS) and its board for reference. This board comprises some of the most distinguished professionals in the country. Similarly, the staff of GRTS, including the director general and other journalists, are among the finest in The Gambia. Yet, political influence over the broadcaster’s operations is an open secret, especially after revelations that a senior ruling party figure allegedly claimed the power to determine who becomes director general and who is maintained or fired. The same applies to the governing board of the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). Very honourable and distinguished people there, but is it not the same institution that the government has been using to control the media in the guise of regulation and professionalisation? This does not mean independence is impossible, only that structural safeguards alone are insufficient without accompanying strong civil society oversight and a genuine commitment from the highest levels of government to respect the board’s autonomy.
Step 3: In light of the foregoing, one recommendation is to hand over the AI fact-checking tool to the independent fact-checking organisations in the country. Across Africa and globally, civil society and media organisations frequently collaborate with technology companies on verification tools. Drawing on that, the Gambia’s existing fact‑checking ecosystem should be strengthened rather than overshadowed by a more tech-enhanced platform.
International experience shows that independent, civil society‑led fact‑checking is the gold standard. Organisations like Dubawa and FactSpace West Africa have demonstrated that credibility, transparency, and public trust are best achieved when verification is done outside government structures. Donor support from ECOWAS and partners would therefore be more impactful if channelled through these independent platforms, helping them to scale their work, adopt advanced AI‑verification tools, and coordinate more effectively during election periods. Nigeria, home to ECOWAS headquarters and one of the highest concentrations of tech companies in Africa, faces some of the continent’s most severe information disorder challenges. Yet the dominant approach there has been collaboration with civil society and the media, not government‑run fact‑checking.
Broadening the mandate and enhancing capability
Furthermore, the mandate of the centre, as implied by its name, appears to exclude hate and dangerous speeches, although these are the issues that pose a more immediate threat to social cohesion, especially ahead of the election. This calls for broadening the centre’s mandates, or even its name. Kenya’s National Cohesion and Integration Commission and Ghana’s National Peace Council offer examples of how governments in Africa are attempting to address hate speech as part of broader peacebuilding efforts. In The Gambia, the National Human Rights Commission has already begun laying the ground for monitoring and countering hate speech. These efforts could either be integrated into, or complemented by, a centre dedicated to the full spectrum of information disorder.
The Gambia could still become the first country to establish an all-in-one information disorder response centre that combines verification, early‑warning systems, media monitoring, and public education. This would ensure that the most harmful forms of speech receive the urgent attention they deserve.
Enhancing the platform’s capabilities to include audio fact‑checks and multilingual clarifications would significantly help. Dubawa’s audio fact-checking platform already provides a model for this. Also, selectively producing the verdict on widespread claims in local language audio formats for dissemination through radios and social media would greatly help address information disorder, especially in rural areas with little or no internet coverage. FactCheck Gambia has already pioneered this approach, in line with UNESCO’s guidelines on media and information literacy. Ultimately, fact‑checking, regardless of who performs it, is not a panacea for information disorder, though it remains a vital tool. A more comprehensive approach is needed. It is called the “whole‑of‑society” approach that harmonises efforts across sectors, promotes media and information literacy, and develops guidelines for the responsible use of AI‑generated content.
Improving government transparency is another essential pillar. Fully implementing the Access to Information Act 2021 would significantly reduce the vacuum in which rumours and falsehoods thrive, especially about the government. When citizens have timely access to credible information, the incentive to rely on speculation or unverified claims diminishes. This is one of the key responsibilities of the state in creating enabling conditions for reliable information, according to the UNESCO Model Policy Framework for Information Integrity in West Africa and the Sahel, adopted in 2025. Also, government officials must strive to be measured and factual in their public statements, as this contributes significantly to sanitising the information ecosystem.
In a nutshell, the threats posed by mis‑ and disinformation, as well as hate and dangerous speeches, are real and growing. But they can be addressed without placing the government in the untenable position of acting as the nation’s referee of truth. The Gambia already has a strong, independent fact‑checking ecosystem that should be strengthened, not overshadowed, by state‑led initiatives. If the NMDRC is to function as a government communications unit, it should embrace that role transparently. If it is to be independent, it must undergo structural reforms, including moving off the government domain, establishing a multi‑stakeholder governing board, and ensuring genuine operational autonomy. Ultimately, a whole‑of‑society approach, one that is rooted in transparency, media literacy, and strong civil society engagement, offers the most credible path toward safeguarding the country’s information integrity and democratic stability.
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The author, Lamin Jahateh, is a journalist, project management professional, and emerging researcher‑practitioner in peace and conflict studies. He previously served as Programme Manager and acting Secretary General of the Gambia Press Union.
