By Sarjo Barrow, Esq.
This week, presidential aspirants will line up at the Independent Electoral Commission to file nomination papers for the Dec. 5 election. According to local online papers, the IEC has scheduled slots for 27 of them: 12 party candidates and 15 independents. In 2021, EU observers reported that 21 aspirants filed and six were accepted. But imagine, unlikely as it is, that all 27 qualify. Do we have the resources and logistics to run that election?
The Gambia still votes with marbles: one voter, one marble, one drum per candidate at every polling station. FactCheck Gambia counted 1,554 polling stations in 2021, so six candidates meant about 9,300 drums. Twenty-seven candidates would mean nearly 42,000, each painted, sealed, transported, guarded and counted by hand. Counting would stretch into the next day.
Then there is the money. Per the Ministry of Finance, the IEC’s allocation rose 115% in the 2026 budget. For 2027, when Gambians vote three separate times—National Assembly in April, councilors in May, mayors and chairpersons in June—the commission asked for D669.7 million, and lawmakers cut D61.9 million, Kerr Fatou reported. Every name on a ballot is a line item paid by taxpayers.
Lately, a run for office in The Gambia looks like a trade rather than a contest of ideas—a ticket to the corridors of power, a bargaining chip for an appointment after the vote. Twenty registered parties for fewer than a million voters, per the IEC’s own count, do not reflect twenty distinct visions for the country. It simply defies logic. Who is watching the taxpayer’s dalasi while the field keeps growing?
The National Assembly’s answer in the Elections Act 2025 was money. A presidential aspirant must now deposit D1 million, about $13,700, refunded only if the candidate wins 40% of the vote. In 2021, only the winner cleared that bar; the runner-up, with nearly a quarter-million votes, would have lost his deposit. A new party must also pay D2 million to register and keep a secretariat in every administrative region. Most parties are self-funded, and while the Act bans misuse of state resources during the campaign, it sets no spending limits and offers no public funding. An incumbent starts far ahead. A price tag at the door only widens the gap.
A deposit measures whether someone can write a check, not whether anyone wants the candidate. The U.S. Supreme Court saw this decades ago. In Bullock v. Carter (1972), it struck down filing fees under the Equal Protection Clause, calling them “extraordinarily ill-fitted” to weeding out frivolous candidates. In Lubin v. Panish (1974), it held that ballot access “may not constitutionally be measured solely in dollars” and pointed to voter petitions as the fair test. Our Constitution promises equality before the law (Section 33) and the right to stand for office “without unreasonable restrictions” (Section 26). A price tag only the winner gets back would be hard to defend as reasonable if tested in court.
The Constitution already chose voters as the gatekeeper. Section 47 says a presidential candidate “shall” show support from “not less than five thousand registered voters,” including 200 from each administrative area. It leaves the National Assembly one figure to set: the deposit.
That is why a drafting error in the Elections Act 2025 needs fixing. Section 41(2)(a) asks for 5,000 voters “with at least two thousand voters being drawn from each Administrative Area.” Seven areas times 2,000 is 14,000, so the 5,000 figure means nothing. The Assembly’s power over election law, under Section 41 of the Constitution, is “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.” It lets the Assembly give effect to Section 47, not rewrite it. Per Kerr Fatou, the IEC’s chief electoral officer told candidates in September that the requirement is 200 per area. He is right, but the Act still says 2,000. Whether it is a typo or overreach, the Assembly should correct it, and the IEC should publish its legal basis now so that no losing party can turn the error into an election petition.
Even 200 per area treats unequal places as equal. Brikama has 359,451 registered voters; Banjul has 21,372, as of the 2021 presidential election. A Banjul signature carries 17 times the weight of one from Brikama, and because each voter may sign only one nomination paper, Banjul becomes a bottleneck.
We need to resolve the tension between wider ballot access and the integrity of our elections. As the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Lubin, the state has a legitimate interest in keeping ballots within “manageable, understandable limits,” and a procedure that screens out frivolous candidates serves that interest rather than frustrating it. With that in mind, here is a better proposal, through amendments to Section 47 of the Constitution and to the Elections Act:
First, reward proven support. A party whose candidate won at least 5% of the vote in the last presidential election goes on the ballot without signatures. Second, everyone else shows proportional support: 2% of the voters in each administrative area. That means about 7,200 signatures in Brikama, 3,600 in Kanifing, roughly 2,200 to 2,400 each in Janjanbureh, Basse and Kerewan, 1,100 in Mansakonko and 430 in Banjul, about 19,000 in all. Third, if necessary, let voters sign more than one nomination paper.
Finally, keep a modest deposit tied to the actual cost of adding a candidate, and refund it to anyone who wins 5% of the vote. Britain has used that 5% line since 1985. Drop the D2 million registration fee and the regional secretariat requirement. Let parties prove themselves with voters, not office rent.
The marble works because it is simple. The rules for who earns a drum should be just as simple: proven support or enough voters, spread fairly, and a cost that matches what a candidate adds to the bill. Voters, not money, should guard the ballot, and in doing so, they guard the taxpayer too.
By Sarjo Barrow, Esq.
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the position of his employer or of the government.
