By Sarjo Barrow, Esq.
On June 26, 2026, former U.S. national security official John Bolton pleaded guilty to mishandling top-secret material. Years earlier, ex-CIA director David Petraeus admitted to similar misconduct. Both had top-level clearance and still broke the rules. But the U.S. system identified and prosecuted its crimes under a clear law. The Gambia, by contrast, has harsh penalties but no real process for deciding who gets access to secrets: strong locks, but no process for handing out keys.
First, credit where it is due
Withdrawing the Vetting Bill after public outcry was not a failure. Civil society was right to fear it might become a tool for political witch-hunts. In a young democracy, such scrutiny shows health, not weakness. The government showed it can listen. Now, the urgent task is to fix the bill, not abandon the idea.
A secrecy law that the Gambia is trying to bury
The deeper issue is the outdated Official Secrets Act, a 1922 colonial-era law last toughened in 2008, with penalties as severe as life imprisonment. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission rightly called for its repeal. Yet the rest of the security system still relies on this colonial law. Modern policies are built atop a foundation that the state has already promised to scrap under the TRRC recommendations.
To make matters worse, it sits awkwardly alongside the Access to Information Act of 2021, which guarantees a right to know, though it, too, exempts genuine national security information. The real conflict is one of culture and proportion. One law presumes disclosure and lets citizens challenge wrongful denials in court; the other criminalizes disclosure with colonial severity and no public-interest defense. Correlated or not, the frequent leaks of sensitive information are not isolated scandals but symptoms of a bigger problem: access depends on job title and oaths, not tested trustworthiness or clear rules. Leaks are inevitable when no one manages access.
What the leakage problem really exposes
The Bolton and Petraeus cases show a similar problem in a different setting: trusted insiders broke the rules after being formally cleared. In the Gambia, trust is not formally given or tested. It is assumed based on someone’s position. Both systems have leaks, but only one gives the government a clear, legal way to hold people accountable when leaks occur.
Not to mention, the lack of vetting also leaves officials exposed to rumor and suspicion. Without a process to verify who holds sensitive roles, the state cannot fairly investigate, nor can officials defend themselves against unfounded claims. A proper vetting system protects both the state and its people.
Where the gap bites hardest: the cleared lawyer
The problem is most serious for the state attorney at the Attorney General’s Chamber.
State attorneys routinely handle highly sensitive matters, from protected witnesses, national security cases, or intelligence methods, yet all have the same level of access and no formal security clearance system. Unlike the U.S., which uses tiered clearances (public trust, Secret, Top Secret), The Gambia relies mostly on basic employment checks and has no specific penalties for breaches. This is not a reflection on the ethics or professionalism of state lawyers, but an inherited colonial-era gap that remains unaddressed. Updating the system is overdue and should be seen as a practical reform, not a criticism of dedicated professionals.
The American system offers two approaches. In some cases, protective orders safeguard sensitive evidence so that not every lawyer needs clearance to access it. For the most sensitive positions, the U.S. applies a structured clearance system: positions of public trust, Secret, Top Secret, and Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI). Each level involves a thorough review process tailored to the required level of access. Importantly, if a clearance is granted or revoked, that decision can be challenged and reviewed by a court. This independent oversight reinforces fairness, helps prevent political misuse, and is fundamental to building public confidence, principles that remain important for any vetting system, including in the Gambia.
The lesson: The Gambia needs a clearance system for attorneys and others with sensitive access, with actual limits and oversight to prevent abuse.
A way forward: key reforms
The Gambia needs a vetting system with real limits and oversight. Key reforms should include:
First, separate transitional-justice vetting from security clearance. The old bill failed because it mixed removing past abusers with long-term access control.
Second, anchor vetting in parliamentary oversight. Denials should be explained and appealable before an independent body, such as the courts, so the system cannot be weaponized against critics.
Third, start by using the existing classification powers. The National Security Council Act of 2025 already authorizes the President to issue rules governing the classification and protection of information. This is a good, lower-risk place to begin. It can define access levels and set clear rules for handling sensitive material, including how a state attorney may bring secrets into a closed courtroom with enforceable protections. The Gambia does not need to wait for a new law to start here.
Finally, repeal the colonial Official Secrets Act. Replace it with a modern law that defines classified information, sets fair penalties, and, for the first time in The Gambia, protects whistleblowers who expose wrongdoing. The country has no dedicated whistleblower law today, which means an official who leaks evidence of corruption faces the same punishment as one who sells secrets to a foreign power. Whistleblower protection separates betrayal from service and ensures that secrecy can never hide wrongdoing.
No system will stop all leaks. But a clear, legal process lets even top officials be held accountable without fueling political revenge. The Gambia has strong penalties. What it lacks is real access control and the discipline to separate protection from repression.
