By Sarjo Barrow, Esq.
When public discontent emerged regarding the nomination of a particular candidate for the new Anti-Corruption Commission, I refrained from commenting. My focus has always been on the law itself rather than the guilt or innocence of any individual. However, the recent comments made by the Vice President during a National Assembly sitting compel me to weigh in on this critical issue.
The Vice President’s statements regarding the decision to replace one of the nominees were notably transparent. He openly raised a “claim of corruption” that cast a “specter of doubt” on the nominee’s integrity, prompting the government to act to maintain public confidence in an institution meant to combat corruption.
Yet when lawmakers sought clarification on whether these allegations had been substantiated, the Vice President’s response was concerning: “I didn’t say that there was an adverse finding. It’s not that it has been proven or not.”
This admission signals a significant problem. According to the government’s account, a nominee approved by the National Assembly is being withdrawn not for any proven misconduct but for an unproven allegation the nominee denies. While the desire to preserve integrity within the Commission is understandable, the Anti-Corruption Act of 2023 outlines a specific process to be followed precisely to avoid impulsive decisions.
That process is exacting. The Act establishes a framework requiring candidates to be vetted by an independent committee before the President consults the Public Service Commission for appointments, and that no nominee is valid unless approved by the National Assembly. This three-step process is not mere bureaucracy; it serves as a safeguard against arbitrary actions from the Executive branch.
The Act’s wording here is deliberate. Under section 3(4), the President consults the Public Service Commission, meaning he must seek its view but is not bound by it. In contrast, the appointment is made “subject to the approval” of the National Assembly. Approval, unlike consultation, is a true condition: without it, there is no valid appointment. The Assembly’s role is the binding safeguard, not a formality the Executive can route around.
The rules on removal are tighter still. Under section 4(3), a member may be removed by the President only on the recommendation of a committee and only for specified grounds, such as serious misconduct or bankruptcy. Section 4(5) makes the safeguard explicit: for serious misconduct, the President “shall not remove” a member unless he first receives a report from a committee appointed by the Chief Justice. Section 4(6) fixes the composition of that committee: a Court of Appeal judge as chairperson, a senior legal practitioner, and a representative of civil society. This is precisely the independent, judicially anchored inquiry the Act demands before anyone is removed over an integrity concern. The grounds for removal must be objective and clearly defined; concepts like “doubt” or “bad publicity” do not meet the criteria for exclusion from the Commission.
There is a reason for this rigidity. Security of tenure is fundamentally important to an effective commission, and autonomy enables it to operate efficiently and to ensure government accountability.
Should the Executive have the power to alter its composition without the safeguard provided in the Act, for whatever reason, there is a risk that the Commission could be seen as a mechanism serving the interests of those in authority rather than as an independent body combating corruption. The creators of the Act recognized this delicate balance and incorporated measures to protect members from outside influences.
Importantly, this process not only protects the institution but also safeguards the individuals involved. A thorough inquiry is not merely a bureaucratic formality for the accused; it serves to root out genuine misconduct while exonerating the innocent. By bypassing this vital step, the government has forfeited an essential mechanism for transparency and fairness.
For the record, this op-ed is not dismissing the concerns the public and civil society have raised; nor does it suggest that the concerns surrounding the nominee are without merit. After all, per unverified accounts in the public domain, the nominee allegedly has admitted to drafting a legal document and accepting payment from a party involved in a matter in which he was also involved, potentially indicating a conflict of interest.
But that is an argument for process, not against it. Rather than pursuing a lawful inquiry to resolve these complexities, the government has opted for a shortcut, bypassing the due process required by law. The civil society group that initially raised allegations rightly called for an investigation, insisting that removal should occur only “if found culpable.”
The public record shows the National Assembly confirmed the nominees. That confirmation matters more than the paperwork that follows. Section 3(4) provides that members “shall be appointed by the President … subject to the approval of the National Assembly,” language that places the appointment first and treats the Assembly’s approval as the condition that completes it. On that reading, the appointment is legally made when the President acts, and the Assembly approves; the appointment letter and the swearing-in are the administrative and ceremonial steps that follow, not the moment the appointment occurs. As section 2 puts it, a “member” is a person “appointed in accordance with section 3,” and that test is met once the section 3 process, including approval, is complete.
It is fair to acknowledge what the Act does not spell out. It does not state, in so many words, whether the President may decline to appoint a candidate the committee selected and the Assembly approved, nor what happens if approval is withheld. But that silence should be read in light of the Act’s purpose. An anti-corruption commission designed to hold the Executive accountable cannot sensibly leave the Executive a free hand to reject confirmed members at will; the better construction is that “shall be appointed,” once the committee has selected and the Assembly approved, imposes a duty to formalize rather than a fresh discretion to second-guess. Reading the gap the other way would defeat the very independence the process exists to protect.
If that is correct, the confirmed nominees are already members, and their position cannot be altered except through the removal process the Act prescribes, including the Chief Justice’s committee under sections 4(5) and 4(6). Even on the narrower view that some step remains outstanding, the Executive’s only lawful route is a fair inquiry against objective criteria, not withdrawal on an unproven allegation. Either way, “doubt” is not a lawful basis for displacing a confirmed nominee. The nominee, for his part, retains the right to withdraw from consideration at any time; on the Vice President’s own representation to legislators, such a withdrawal would carry no adverse finding.
In all scenarios, any replacement will need to undergo the vetting process again and secure approval from the National Assembly. While the government may believe it has reached a reasonable conclusion, the approach used to reach it raises concerns warranting careful consideration.
In anti-corruption work, the process is the protection. The same inquiry that roots out genuine misconduct is what clears the innocent, and skipping it forfeits both. The government may be satisfied it reached the right result, but a commission built by setting aside its own founding law starts its life compromised. If we want an institution that can hold power to account, it has to be assembled by the rule of law, not despite it.
